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To the Editor: As public health
practitioners directly involved in con-
structing, maintaining, and interpret-
ing syndromic disease surveillance
systems, we offer the following com-
ments on the Buehler et al. article,
“Syndromic Surveillance and Bio-
terrorism-related Epidemics” (1). In
general, this article was well-crafted. It
reviewed the potential for syndromic
surveillance to detect various diseases
of bioterrorism, specifically an anthrax
event based on the inhalational anthrax
cases of 2001. However, the reader
may conclude that hospital-based syn-
dromic surveillance is potentially inef-
fective and unproven.
Buehler et al. describe how, within
18 hours, a presumptive diagnosis of
anthrax would prompt a full-scale
response. We think that functional
syndromic surveillance can respond
to the rapid onset of hospital-based
disease. To isolate and positively
identify Bacillus anthracis from a
blood culture would take ≈48 hours.
Syndromic surveillance should detect
a large number of cases within 24
hours. A fully functional hospital syn-
dromic surveillance system that uses
automated analysis (such as the daily
emergency department–based surveil-
lance with SaTScan in New York
City) should identify a substantial
increase in a relevant syndrome with-
in 12 to 24 hours after data submis-
sion (2). A continued daily rise in any
disease category would most certainly
set off alarms in a syndromic surveil-
lance network. If active statewide lab-
oratory surveillance is included in
syndromic surveillance, such as the
gram-positive rod surveillance con-
ducted in Connecticut (3), this sur-
veillance should rapidly detect even
single cases of anthrax concurrent
with the presumptive diagnosis within
the hospital.
The authors also state that syn-
dromic surveillance would not detect
outbreaks too small to trigger statisti-
cal alarms. The combination of active
and passive surveillance in the hospi-
tal admissions–based syndromic sur-
veillance in Connecticut allows a
number of syndromes to be tracked
immediately upon notification; these
syndromes include pneumonia and
acute respiratory disease in healthcare
workers admitted to a hospital, all dis-
ease clusters, and fever with rash ill-
ness. This system is very flexible, and
active surveillance of other syn-
dromes can be quickly instituted as
required. This active surveillance
component has been proven useful.
The first 2 of Connecticut’s 17 con-
firmed human cases of West Nile
virus during 2002 were discovered in
August when a health director, who
regularly monitored the syndromic
admissions data for the hospital in his
municipality, requested immediate
West Nile virus testing from the hos-
pital’s infection-control department
when he received two late summer
reports of neurologic illness.
Buehler et al. state that specificity
for distinguishing bioterrorism-related
epidemics from more ordinary illness
may be low because the early symp-
toms of bioterrorism-related illness
overlap with those of many common
infections. Illness specificity can be
modulated within a syndromic surveil-
lance system by making changes in the
definition of the information request-
ed, the method of analysis used, or by
incorporating varying amounts of
active surveillance into a passive
reporting system. In Connecticut,
annual rates of hospital admissions for
pneumonia and respiratory illness
have significantly increased (>3 stan-
dard deviations) during winter
months. These increases have corre-
sponded temporally with peaks in lab-
oratory-confirmed influenza reports
and in our state-based and the national
sentinel physician influenzalike illness
reports. Similarly, in the military-
based syndromic surveillance system,
respiratory outbreaks are detected by
monitoring routine outpatient visits
and pharmacy prescriptions. Absolute
numbers of visits, as well as percent-
age of visits, to primary care clinics
for influenzalike illness provide up-
to-date information on respiratory
disease conditions at military installa-
tions in both active-duty personnel and
family members. 
Connecticut has added additional
active surveillance categories to its
syndromic surveillance for potential
SARS cases by gathering extensive
data on all healthcare providers hospi-
talized with respiratory illness. In the
absence of an identified pathogen, the
entire United States was conducting
syndromic surveillance for SARS
during the spring of 2003.
What are existing alternatives to
rapid, patient-based reporting through
syndromic surveillance for bioterror-
ism and emerging illness? Will indi-
vidual physicians (i.e., the “astute cli-
nicians”) truly recognize an increase
of nonspecific symptoms among their
patients in time to warn public health
authorities of an impending bioterror-
ism event? During the past 4 years in
the U.S. military population, unless
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disease was extremely severe with
high rates of hospitalization, virtually
no outbreaks of infectious diseases
detected by syndromic surveillance
were reported to public health offi-
cials, even when effective preventive
measures existed. Our experience
leads us to encourage states and
municipalities to develop functional,
patient-based syndromic surveillance
systems and discover both their limi-
tations and their possibilities.
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In reply: The thoughtful letter of
Drs. Dembek, Cochrane, and Pavlin
draws attention to several key themes
emerging in the ongoing dialogue
about the utility and role of syndromic
surveillance. First, as illustrated by
their work, the growing body of expe-
rience in conducting syndromic sur-
veillance should advance this dia-
logue beyond the hypothetical frame-
work described in our manuscript to a
more evidence-based assessment of
epidemic detection. Second, in the
absence of a bioterrorism-related ill-
ness since 2001, the utility of syn-
dromic surveillance for detecting nat-
urally occurring events is coming into
greater focus, particularly for detect-
ing the onset of anticipated seasonal
upswings in infectious diseases,
including West Nile virus disease,
gastrointestinal illness, and influenza.
Syndromic surveillance coupled
with follow-up investigations can
assist clinicians by alerting them to
communitywide problems likely to be
manifest among their patients. This
recognition may occur at the hospital
level, as reported by Dembek et al. in
the initial recognition of West Nile
virus disease in Connecticut in 2002,
or at the community level, as illustrat-
ed by public health alerts in New York
City to notify clinicians about viral
gastrointestinal illness (1). Multiple
studies have documented that newer
syndromic surveillance systems can
recognize the onset of the annual
influenza season (2), but it is not clear
what these systems add to existing
syndrome-based systems that track
“influenzalike illness” as part of a
larger array of influenza-specific sur-
veillance methods. While Dembek et
al. note that syndromic surveillance
has detected multiple outbreaks that
would have been otherwise unrecog-
nized, Sichel et al. observed that syn-
dromic surveillance did not detect out-
breaks recognized through more tradi-
tional means (1). This discrepancy
emphasizes the need to further assess
the characteristics of epidemics and
surveillance systems that favor detec-
tion by using syndromic methods. 
We recommend distinguishing
between the increasing practice,
prompted by concerns about bioter-
rorism, of syndromic surveillance for
epidemic detection and the longstand-
ing and common practice of using
syndrome-based case definitions in
public health surveillance. Such case
definitions have been used in situa-
tions in which a wide net is cast to
identify potential cases of a particular
disease (e.g., acute flaccid paralysis as
part of global efforts to eradicate
poliomyelitis [3], liver disease associ-
ated with a new therapy for latent
tuberculosis infection [4], and inhala-
tional anthrax in New Jersey in 2001,
after bioterrorism-related cases were
clinically detected [5]), when resource
and infrastructure constraints do not
allow routine use of laboratory-based
definitions (e.g., surveillance for sex-
ually transmitted diseases in infra-
structure-weak countries [6]), and
when surveillance is initiated for a
new disease of unknown origin (e.g.,
toxic shock syndrome [7], AIDS [8],
and severe acute respiratory syn-
drome [SARS] [9]). Although SARS
surveillance did not represent syn-
dromic surveillance according to this
distinction, relationships between
health departments and hospitals, fos-
tered in establishing syndromic sur-
veillance, likely facilitated SARS sur-
veillance. 
New guidelines offer an approach
for evaluating syndromic surveillance
systems, including what is learned
from follow-up of statistical alarms
and whether syndromic surveillance
or other methods lead to the earliest
detection of outbreaks (10). These
guidelines also provide a framework
for modeling exercises to test syn-
dromic surveillance under various
bioterrorism scenarios, supplement-
ing experience gained from real-life,
but typically less severe, seasonal ill-
ness or community epidemics.
Eventually, this information should be
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useful in developing guidance for
health departments seeking to deter-
mine whether and how to implement
syndromic surveillance.
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To the Editor: Polymicrobial
invasive infections are infrequent,
representing <10% of the invasive
infections of known etiology (1).
They are often correlated with a pre-
disposing factor: immunodeficiency
(e.g., diabetes mellitus, malignancies,
extremes of age) or use of a central
catheter. Escherichia hermanii is an
extremely rare etiologic agent for
invasive infections; only four cases
were published from 1980 to 2002.
We report the first case of double
invasive infection by E. hermanii and
Staphylococcus aureus and emphasize
the importance of screening of all the
septic foci for demonstrating a
polymicrobial invasive infection. 
In August 2000, a 54-year-old
comatose man was admitted to our
infectious diseases department with a
10-day history of fever. He had a
medical history of vertebral arthrosis
(lumbar laminectomy in 1989) and
insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus.
Six weeks before, he had received for
3 days gluteal injections with kebu-
sone (an intramuscular nonsteriodal
antiinflammatory drug [NSAID]) for
acute lower back pain. Twenty-eight
days after the first injection, a gluteal
abscess developed, which was surgi-
cally drained, without perioperative
antimicrobial therapy. Three days
later, he became febrile, and pyrexia
persisted despite local wound man-
agement and treatment with oxacillin,
4 g/day for 3 days; cefuroxime, 3
g/day, and gentamicin, 160 mg/day
for another 7 days.
The patient became comatose and
was transferred to our department. At
that time, the physical examination
showed fever (40.2°C), neck stiffness,
Brudzinski sign, thoracic dullness,
and bilateral crackling rales. The level
of C-reactive protein was 123 mg/L.
Renal failure was noted with a creati-
nine blood level of 312 mmol/L and
uncontrolled diabetes with fasting
glucose of 24.75 mmol/L. Computed
tomographic (CT) scan of the brain
did not show brain abscesses or
tumors. Examination of the cere-
brospinal fluid (CSF) indicated a pro-
tein level of 2.67 g/L, decreased glu-
cose concentration of 0.55 mmol/L,
and a leukocyte count of 2.3 x 109/L
with 96% neutrophils; no microbial
pathogens were demonstrable under
direct examination of CSF. Chest x-
ray identified bronchopneumonia and
bilateral pleural effusion. The pleural
fluid analysis revealed a purulent exu-
date—protein, 4.5 g/L—containing
55% neutrophils. A urine specimen
and three blood samples were
obtained for cultures over the first 4
hours after admission. A bacterial
invasive infection was considered and
the antibiotic therapy was started with
ceftriaxone, 2 g/day, and rifampin,
1,200 mg/day. Concomitantly, the
patient received colloids to reestablish
blood volume, intravenous dexam-
ethasone, 6 mg four times daily, to
diminish the cerebral edema; and fast-
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